All posts by Garry Peterson

Prof. of Environmental science at Stockholm Resilience Centre at Stockholm University in Sweden.

Modelling a social-ecological poverty trap due to infectious disease

In an interesting article Poverty trap formed by the ecology of infectious diseases (Proc Royal Soc B 2009) Mathew Bonds and others, describes how they couple a simple infectious disease model with an simple economic development model to produce model of a infectious disease induced poverty trap.  They write:

The combined causal effects of health on poverty and poverty on health implies a positive feedback system. Despite the importance of understanding such critical and systematic ecological interactions between humans and their most important natural enemies, and the anecdotal evidence that such poverty traps may indeed exist, we lack mechanistic frameworks of poverty traps that are rooted in the dynamics of disease. Here, we propose such a model. We find that a prototypical host–pathogen system, coupled with simple economic models, induces a poverty trap. More broadly, this model serves to illustrate how feedbacks between people and their environment can potentially give rise to major differences in human survival and economic welfare (Diamond 1997).

… we illustrate our underlying concept using a general one-disease SIS (susceptible–infected–susceptible) model, where individuals can be serially reinfected over the course of their lifetime. This model is meant to serve as the simplest general way of representing the kind of repeated threats of infection faced by poor tropical communities. More specifically, the general model also resembles a typical malaria system (Gandon et al. 2001), which has high prevalence rates among the poor and has been especially implicated in hindering economic growth (Gallup & Sachs 2001).

Their model produces two alternative regimes, a high productivity/low disease regime and a low productivity/high disease regime.

Feedback between economics and the ecology of infectious diseases forms a poverty trap. The prevalence of infectious diseases, I*(M) (black line), falls as per capita income rises, while per capita income, M*(I) (grey line), falls as disease prevalence, I, rises. The disease and income functions are in equilibrium where these two curves intersect at (I*(M*), M*(I*)). Two of these equilibria (I*(M*1), M*(I*1) and I*(M*3), M*(I*3)) are stable, and one (I*(M*2), M*(I*2)) is unstable. The poverty trap is the basin of attraction around (I*(M*3), M*(I*3)). α = 0.06; β̄ = 40; μ̄ = 0.01; ν = 0.02; h̄ = 90; δ = 5; ϱ = 0.003; τ = 0.15; ϕ = 15; κ = 30.

Feedback between economics and the ecology of infectious diseases forms a poverty trap. The prevalence of infectious diseases, I*(M) (black line), falls as per capita income rises, while per capita income, M*(I) (grey line), falls as disease prevalence, I, rises. The disease and income functions are in equilibrium where these two curves intersect at (I*(M*), M*(I*)). Two of these equilibria (I*(M*1), M*(I*1) and I*(M*3), M*(I*3)) are stable, and one (I*(M*2), M*(I*2)) is unstable. The poverty trap is the basin of attraction around (I*(M*3), M*(I*3)). α = 0.06; β̄ = 40; μ̄ = 0.01; ν = 0.02; h̄ = 90; δ = 5; ϱ = 0.003; τ = 0.15; ϕ = 15; κ = 30.

In this model, a social-ecological system can be pushed into or out of the poverty trap by changes that effect labour productivity, such as changes in the level of education or infrastructure, or changes in disease prevalence due to the expansion or contraction of public health.

In the paper the authors show that empirical patterns of disease burden and income suggest the existence of disease poverty traps.

They conclude:

While we hope that our model framework can serve as a useful point of departure for exploring more complex relationships, the theoretical analysis we present here has significant implications: simply coupling economics with a well-established model of the ecology of infectious diseases can imply radically different levels of health and economic welfare (i.e. poverty traps) depending on initial conditions. The practical implications are also significant. Because the world’s leading killers of the poor—malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, diarrhoea and respiratory infections—are highly preventable and treatable, current global efforts to improve public health in areas of extreme poverty could theoretically pay long-term economic dividends. Furthermore, this analysis underscores that there are dramatic implications if economic activity is coupled with ecological processes that are well-known to behave in nonlinear ways.

Mapping global flows of virtual green and blue water

Green and blue virtual-water ‘flows’ related to wheat trade by major exporting and importing nations (km3/year). The size of each pie is determined by the amount of virtual water ‘traded’. Countries with virtual-water ‘exports’ are depicted in green and countries with virtual-water ‘import’ in red;<br /> the colour shade depends on the quantity of virtual water ‘traded’. Period 2000–2004.
Green and blue virtual-water ‘flows’ related to wheat trade by major exporting and importing nations (km3/year).
The size of each pie is determined by the amount of virtual water ‘traded’.
Countries with virtual-water ‘exports’ are depicted in green and countries with virtual-water ‘import’ in red; the colour shade depends on the quantity of virtual water ‘traded’. Period 2000–2004.

M.M. Aldaya, J.A. Allan and A.Y. Hoekstra in their paper Strategic importance of green water in international crop trade (Ecological Economics 2009) doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.11.001 map global flows of virtual water in the wheat trade.

In their paper they explain their figure:

The map presented in Fig. 6 shows the virtual-water ‘flows’ to the five major importing countries for wheat for the period 2000–2004.

By ‘importing’ virtual water embodied in agricultural commodities, a nation “saves” the amount of water it would have required to produce those commodities domestically.

Though from an importing country perspective it is not relevant whether products have been produced using green or blue water in the country of origin, from a global point of view it has important implications (Chapagain et al., 2006a). For instance, Egypt is the largest importer of wheat, with the USA providing about 45% of the country’s imports. Wheat from Egypt has an average virtual-water content of 930 m3/ton of which 100% is blue water (Chapagain et al., 2006a), while the USA has a virtual-water content for wheat of 1707 m3/ton of which 39.8% is blue water (Table 3).

By importing wheat, Egypt saves 930 m3 of water per ton of wheat. Globally, when imported from the USA, there is not a total water saving because wheat production in the USA requires more water than in Egypt. Exports to Egypt from this country result in a considerable net global water loss of 777 m3 per ton. However, if we just look at blue water only, importing wheat from the USA to Egypt saves 251 m3/ton (since USA production requires 679 m3/ton of blue water and wheat production in Egypt 930 m3/ton).

Along these lines, Egypt, as some other water-scarce importing countries, has formulated policies to import low value but high water consuming food like cereals (Van Hofwegen, 2005). Nevertheless, even if the potential of trade to “save” water at national level is substantial, most international food trade occurs for reasons not related to water resources (CAWMA, 2007).

Maping global virtual waters flows

Fig. 4. World map of virtual water exports. (a) Total virtual water exports (flows exceeding 10 km3 yr−1 are shown); (b) flows of virtual water exports originating from blue (irrigation) water (flows exceeding 1.0 km3 yr−1 are shown); and (c) virtual water exports originating from nonrenewable and nonlocal blue water (flows exceeding 0.5 km3 yr−1 are shown).
Fig. 4. World map of virtual water exports.
(a) Total virtual water exports (flows exceeding 10 km3 yr−1 are shown);
(b) flows of virtual water exports originating from blue (irrigation) water (flows exceeding 1.0 km3 yr−1 are shown); and
(c) virtual water exports originating from nonrenewable and nonlocal blue water (flows exceeding 0.5 km3 yr−1 are shown).

Figure is from Hanasaki and others paper An estimation of global virtual water flow and sources of water withdrawal for major crops and livestock products using a global hydrological model (2009 Journal of Hydrology) doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2009.09.028.

They explain the figure:

The estimated flows of virtual water exports and imports in 2000 by nation were aggregated into 22 regions worldwide (Table 9; Fig. 4) to show net exports between regions.

Fig. 4a shows the virtual water export flows for all water sources. The figure indicates that North and South America were major regions from which virtual water export flows originate; East Asia, Europe, Central America, and West Asia were the major destinations. This pattern of flows agrees with the studies of (Oki and Kanae, 2004), (Yang et al., 2006) and (Hoekstra and Hung, 2005).

Fig. 4b shows the virtual water exports of blue water (withdrawn from streamflow, medium-size reservoirs, and NNBW sources), and

Fig. 4c shows the virtual water exports of NNBW. Most major flows of blue water and NNBW originated from North America and South Asia.

Interestingly, South America was the major total virtual water exporter but a minor blue water exporter because less cropland is irrigated on this continent.

Notably, South Asia, which is densely populated and where demand results in water scarcity (Oki and Kanae, 2006 and Hanasaki et al., 2008b), showed blue and NNBW virtual water export flows. [note: NNBW – is non-renewable and non-local blue water.]

Richard Alley explains how CO2 is the climate’s “biggest control knob”

alley_co2talk Richard Alley gave a well reviewed Bjerknes Lecture at the December AGU meetings in San Francisco, in which clearly and interestingly explains the paleo-climatic evidence of how CO2 is a key part of the Earth’s climate regulatory system.  Lots of interesting research, some of it quite recent, is synthesized clearly.

His talk The Biggest Control Knob: Carbon Dioxide in Earth’s Climate History is available on the AGU meeting website.

Richard Alley, is a professor of geosciences, at Penn State University and author of the popular science paeleo-climatology book The Two-Mile Time Machine: Ice Cores, Abrupt Climate Change, and Our Future.

Reflections on COP15

Reporting on the climate meetings in Copenhagen picks out many different meanings from the chaos and limited success of the meeting.  Below are some reports from Canada, the UK, and the USA.

Comments linking to any other good reports on the conference outcome would be fantastic, especially if they are from other countries and raise other points.

Jeffrey Simpson, the Toronto Globe and Mail’s national affairs columnist, writes:

Ideally, the leaders who participated in the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen would have agreed to long-term emissions reductions, backed by short-term reduction targets. Apparently, however, even a 50-per-cent overall reduction target for 2050 was too stringent for too many countries and therefore Copenhagen ended without either long-term targets or short-term yardsticks.

Measurable yardsticks would have required hard decisions by many countries whose publics are not ready for strong action such as the United States; by democratic governments such as Canada that do not wish to lead; and by developing countries such as China and India unwilling to acknowledge that although the developed world has created most of the emissions to date, the fast-developing countries will be responsible for a growing share of emissions in the next half-century.

Instead, what seems to have been agreed upon was a process whereby countries will list their targets voluntarily. A long negotiation will follow to try to make these binding and included in an international treaty. The result was better than a complete collapse of the talks, but it left much of the detailed work for long negotiations ahead.

Copenhagen, therefore, was a predictable disappointment. The gaps coming into the talks between and among countries’ positions were too large; the domestic political stakes in some cases were too high; the economic fears too great; the temptation to finger-point too irresistible. …

Finding common ground among them was always going to be supremely difficult, and it remains so in the months, perhaps years, ahead as countries struggle to do better than they managed at Copenhagen, where they avoided the worst but did not achieve the best.

The negotiations did underscore the emergence of the world’s new power structure, since the critical negotiations involved the United States, China, India and Brazil, with the European Union off to one side, and Canada off the stage completely.

It took a major effort by President Barack Obama to save the negotiations; it will take an even larger one for him to persuade his Congress and the U.S. public to do something serious about climate change. But a Canadian could only admire his moral passion for the issue and his determination to lead, in contrast to the Canadian government’s approach that, appropriately enough, earned the country “Fossil of the Year” award by environmental groups at the conference.

In the New York Times, Andrew Revkin and John Broder report:

Many participants also said that the chaos and contentiousness of the talks may signal the end of reliance on a process that for almost two decades had been viewed as the best approach to tackling global warming: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and a series of 15 conventions following a 1992 climate summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro.

The process has become unworkable, many said, because it has proved virtually impossible to forge consensus among the disparate blocs of countries fighting over environmental guilt, future costs and who should referee the results.

“The climate treaty process isn’t going to die, but the real work of coordinating international efforts to reduce emissions will primarily occur elsewhere,” said Michael Levi, who has been tracking the diplomatic effort for the Council on Foreign Relations.

That elsewhere will likely be a much smaller group of nations, roughly 30 countries responsible for 90 percent of global warming emissions. It was these nations that Mr. Obama rallied in a series of dramatic encounters on Friday to finally ink a deal that starts a flow of financing for poor countries to adapt to climate change and sets up a system for major economies to monitor and report their greenhouse gas emissions.

This smaller group of nations will meet periodically to tackle a narrower agenda of issues, like technology sharing or the merging of carbon trading markets, without the chaos and posturing of the United Nations process. A version of this already exists in the 17-nation Major Economies Forum, which has been a model of decorum and progress compared with what the world saw unfold at the climate talks.

The deal worked out in Copenhagen is a political agreement forged by major emitters to curb greenhouse gases, to help developing nations build clean-energy economies and to send money flowing to cushion the effects of climate change on vulnerable states. But even if countries live up to their commitments on emissions, a stark gap remains — measured in tens of billions of tons of projected flows of carbon dioxide — between nations’ combined pledges and what would be required to reliably avert the risks of disruptive changes in rainfall and drought, ecosystems and polar ice cover from global warming, scientists say.

An editorial from the UK’s Financial Times states:

One wonders how a conference to conclude two years of detailed negotiations, building on more than a decade of previous talks, could have collapsed into such a shambles. It is as though no preparatory work had been done. Consensus on the most basic issues was lacking. Were countries there to negotiate binding limits on emissions or not? Nobody seemed to know.

From the start, the disarray was total. In this, at least, the attention to detail was impressive. The organisers invited more people to the event than could be accommodated, and were puzzled when they arrived. Delegates queued in the freezing cold for hours, a scene that summed it all up. The organisers had planned a celebration of a grand new global pact – but the party was a disaster and they forgot to bring the agreement.

Governments need to understand, even if they cannot say so, that Copenhagen was worse than useless. If you draw the world’s attention to an event of this kind, you have to deliver, otherwise the political impetus is lost. To declare what everybody knows to be a failure a success is feeble, and makes matters worse. Loss of momentum is now the danger. In future, governments must observe the golden rule of international co-operation: agree first, arrange celebrations and photo opportunities later.

Fiona Harvey, Ed Crooks and Andrew Ward write in the Financial Times:

Developed countries insist that the accord, while imperfect, is nevertheless a significant step. As published, the section intended to show commitments to curb emissions by big economies is blank, but by February it is supposed to have been filled in. If leading economies repeat the offers made in public, the agreement will not be far from the political declaration the UN was looking for.

The real problem with the accord, however, is that it has not been formally accepted by the Copenhagen conference, which means it can easily be sidelined, an impression reinforced by China’s words. That leaves the UN with a further six months of tough and possibly hopeless negotiations to win acceptance, to be followed by the nearly impossible task of turning any such acceptance into a treaty. It also leaves the world without a global framework to tackle climate change.

It is these conclusions, after two weeks of unprecedented scenes, that have led some to question whether the UN, with processes vulnerable to delays, grandstanding and blackmail by special interests, is the forum in which to reach a treaty. There is talk from developed country officials of pressing ahead with a much smaller group of the leading economies, such as the Group of 20, responsible for the majority of global emissions – a “coalition of the willing” for the climate.

Yvo de Boer, the most senior UN climate official, made a strong defence of the UN as he prepared to leave the meeting, saying all countries must be included in making any deal. If it was restricted to the G20, he said, “you wouldn’t have round the table the countries who are in the front line of dealing with [the effects of] climate change but have minuscule economies.

“That’s part of the reason why people went to the trouble of creating the UN: that people wanted to address problems equitably.”

In Time magazine Bryan Walsh writes about lessons of COP15:

Green schism: The Environmental Defense Fund — a U.S. green group that often works with business — praised the Copenhagen Accord as an “important step,” and other mainstream environmental groups had a similarly measured response. But the new group 350.org — which demands extremely sharp and immediate carbon reductions — denounced the deal and protests outside the venue began almost immediately….

It’s going to get harder, and that’s a good thing: In the weeks preceding the summit, world leaders had downgraded expectations for a binding agreement, aiming instead for a broad political agreement while kicking tough decisions such as emission targets down the road. Logically, that should have made the talks at Copenhagen easier. Obviously that’s not what happened, as the summit’s final 48 hours were passed on the brink of collapse. But if Copenhagen was tough, Mexico City will be a lot more so, because there, countries will be tasked with filling in details sketched in the Copenhagen Accord.

Yet the very struggle to reach agreement at Copenhagen, and the tougher talks to come, demonstrate that climate diplomacy has finally come of age. The negotiations at Copenhagen were so contentious because of the very real impact the proposals on the table will have, not only on the environment, but also on national economies. China and the U.S. played hardball — and sent heads of government to do the talking — precisely because they had something to lose. The onset of a kind of climate realpolitik, which eschews hot air for real action, signals is a sign that global climate talks have moved beyond symbolic rhetoric.

What COP15 means for the planet?

Climate Interactive used their climate policy model, C-Roads, to analyze the Copenhagen Accord and national commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Their analysis assumes that nations follow their commitments. Their analysis shows:

The Accord adopted in Copenhagen (accessed 19 December 2009) calls for deep cuts in global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius compared to preindustrial levels. Simulations of the C-ROADS model show that doing so requires global greenhouse gas emissions to peak by 2020 and then fall 50% below 1990 levels by 2050 (a cut of approximately 60% below current emissions).

However, simulations of the C-ROADS model show a large gap between the targets in the final Copenhagen agreement and the commitments offered by individual nations. Using the C=ROADS model, the researchers estimate that current confirmed proposals (that is, submissions to the UNFCCC or official government positions) would raise expected global mean temperature by 3.9 Celsuis by 2100. Including conditional proposals, legislation under debate and unofficial government statements would lower expected warming to an increase of approximately 2.9 C over preindustrial levels.

The graph and table below show simulation results from the C-Roads model for four scenarios: business as usual (calibrated to the IPCC A1FI scenario), current confirmed commitments, potential commitments, and the low emissions path required to achieve an expected warming of 2 degrees C over pre-industrial levels.

ci_emmit

ci_table1

Seth Borenstein of Associated Press interviewed John Sterman and Andrew Jones from Climate Interactive as well as Cynthia Rosenzweig and Yvo de Boer:

Going above 450 parts per million “will change everything,” said NASA climate impacts researcher Cynthia Rosenzweig.

“It’s not just one or two things,” Rosenzweig said. “There will be changes in water, food, ecosystems, health, and those changes also interact with each other.”

At that point, among other things, millions of people would be subject to regular coastal flooding, droughts would cause food shortages, coral reefs would dramatically die off affecting the ocean food chain, and about 20 percent of the world’s known species would be significantly endangered, according to Rosenzweig and other climate scientists.

Systems dynamics experts John Sterman of MIT and Andrew Jones of the Sustainability Institute in Vermont compare our carbon problem to a bathtub. Each year we pump carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, much of it remains there. It lasts for about a century, although about half of the carbon dioxide produced is removed each year by forests and oceans.

Sterman and Jones figure the world can afford to churn out another 920 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide between now and 2050. Holding emissions to that level offers a better than even chance at keeping the world under 450 parts per million and avoiding a crucial temperature rise.

But that will be a challenge. Forty years of pumping emissions at the level we have now would exceed the safe level by more than 50 percent. And that doesn’t even account for future levels of greenhouse gases from booming economies like those in China and India.

Ideally, the world should produce 80 percent less in greenhouse gases than we do now, Jones said.

Technically, the delay of at least one year in implementing strict emissions limits — thanks to the nonbinding deal in Copenhagen — may not hurt. But it’s a momentum issue and a compounding interest issue, said Achim Steiner, head of the United Nations Environment Program. It’s like debt on a credit card: Every time a person puts off paying the balance, it grows bigger and harder to resolve.

Every year of delay means the chance of achieving a stable and healthy climate “is getting smaller and smaller,” said Yvo de Boer, head of U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which ran the Copenhagen negotiations. …

Yet de Boer is optimistic.

“I think science will drive it,” de Boer said. “I think business will drive it. I think society will drive it.”

Portraits of Resilience

Portraits of Resilience, a photography exhibit at the Danish National Muesum for COP15, organized by the NGO Many Strong Voices.  The projects goal was:

to illustrate in a direct and personal way the ethical dimension of the climate change discussion. The goal is to train children in the use of digital media in order to help bring personal stories and faces from vulnerable regions onto the floor of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. It is important that the world be able to see not only effects of climate change but the efforts people are making to both combat and adapt to it.

Below are photos from from Nunavut in Canada and Nesseby in Norway:

The arena in Pangnirtung used to open October or the beginning of November. Now it opens the end of December or beginning of January. The ice doesn’t freeze as much as it used to because of climate change.

The arena in Pangnirtung used to open October or the beginning of November. Now it opens the end of December or beginning of January. The ice doesn’t freeze as much as it used to because of climate change.

We travel a long distances with reindeer in the spring. If there is less snow on the ground it will be more difficult to drive with the snowmobile and it will get harder to graze the herd.

We travel a long distances with reindeer in the spring. If there is less snow on the ground it will be more difficult to drive with the snowmobile and it will get harder to graze the herd.

Reconnecting floodplains to rivers to reduce systemic flood risk

In policy forum Sustainable Floodplains Through Large-Scale Reconnection to Rivers (Science DOI: 10.1126/science.1178256) by Jeffrey Opperman and others argue that managing flood plains to permit flooding can be a better choice than trying to prevent flooding.  Such a strategy switches from trying to prevent disturbances to managing disturbances.  They write that:

Flooding is the most damaging natural disaster worldwide, and the flood-vulnerable population is expected to grow in coming decades (1). Flood risks will likely increase because of both climate change (1) and shifting land uses, such as filling of wetlands and expansion of impervious surfaces, that lead to more rapid precipitation runoff into rivers. …

Flood-control infrastructure (e.g., levees) prevents high flows from entering floodplains, thus diminishing both natural floodstorage capacity and the processes that sustain healthy riverside forests and wetlands. As a result, floodplains are among the planet’s most threatened ecosystems, even though functioning floodplains—those connected to rivers—are among the most valuable ecosystems for supporting biodiversity and providing goods and services to society (6, 7). We propose that a large-scale shift in land use and policy is urgently needed to achieve economically and environmentally sustainable floodplain management. The area of floodplains allowed to perform the natural function of storing and conveying floodwaters must be expanded by strategically removing levees or setting them back from the river.

Floodplain reconnection will accomplish three primary objectives: flood-risk reduction, an increase in floodplain goods and services, and resiliency to potential climate-change impacts. Efforts should focus on strategic reconnection of large areas of floodplain currently used for agriculture, as large-scale reconnection of densely populated floodplains would be considerably more expensive. The changes we propose will confront considerable socioeconomic and political challenges, but we believe these can be overcome by promoting floodplain land uses that are consistent with private ownership and a vibrant agricultural economy. Although our specific recommendations are for the United States, this vision is applicable worldwide. Similar calls for change have been made in several countries [e.g., (8)].

Reduced Risk, Enhanced Benefit

Large-scale floodplain reconnection will reduce flood risk in two ways. First, land use within reconnected floodplains will move toward activities compatible with periodic inundation. Flood-tolerant land uses (described below) will be much less vulnerable to flood damages and therefore less likely to require disaster relief payments. Second, reconnection increases the area available to store and convey floodwaters and can reduce flood risk for nearby areas. In most of the United States, this benefit occurs haphazardly through levee failure. For example, during 2008 floods in the U.S. Midwest, a town was spared because a nearby levee protecting croplands failed, allowing floodwaters to inundate fields and alleviating pressure on the town’s levees (9). But strategic reconnection of floodplains, designed and implemented to maximize public-safety benefits, holds great promise for reducing local and regional flood risk (8). For example, a study of the Illinois River found that reconnection of 8000 hectares (ha) of floodplain would improve protection for 26,000 ha of farmland by halving the probability of inundation from major floods (10).

Large-scale reconnection of floodplains may also increase flexibility and resilience of water-management infrastructure. Globally, thousands of large, multipurpose dams provide (or are being built to provide) flood control and water supply and/or hydropower. The need for partially empty reservoirs (to store floodwaters) must be balanced with the benefits from full reservoirs (water supply, hydropower, recreation, and environmental flows to maintain healthy ecosystems). Climate-change models suggest that many regions of the world will experience increased frequency of both floods and droughts, exacerbating the challenge of balancing these multiple objectives (1). Large-scale floodplain reconnection provides floodwater storage and conveyance, reducing the need for upstream reservoirs to remain partially empty and thus increasing the benefits they could provide when full. Increased resiliency of water management systems through floodplain reconnection is a promising example of ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change.


The author’s propose that there approach is demonstrated by the Yolo Bypass in California.

Demonstrating Success: The Yolo Bypass
Flooded Yolo Bypass

Flooded Yolo Bypass

Although to date rarely implemented, this vision of large-scale floodplain reconnection is not unprecedented. California’s Yolo Bypass conveys 80% of Sacramento River floodwaters during large events, routing water away from the city of Sacramento (see figure, page 1487 ) (18). The bypass was created in the 1930s by reconnecting a 24,000-ha floodplain when it became apparent that a “levees only” approach would not sufficiently reduce flood damages (19). By conveying large volumes of floodwaters, the bypass increases the flexibility of California’s water management infrastructure. During a March 1986 flood, the bypass conveyed ~12.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of water, more than three times the total flood-control storage volume in all Sacramento basin reservoirs (3.5 bcm). This occurred during a period when the flood-control system was operating near maximum capacity (20). Without the bypass floodplain, California would need to build massive additional flood-control infrastructure or allocate more of its already strained water-supply storage capacity to flood control.

Two-thirds of the bypass is privately owned, productive agriculture. During inundation, the bypass provides habitat for birds and native fish (18). The bypass provides additional ecosystem services, such as open space for a rapidly growing region, recreation (including revenue-producing duck-hunting clubs), and groundwater recharge (of great value as a water bank during droughts) (14).

Economics of ecosystems and biodiversity study available

Climate Issues UpdateThe Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity study (TEEB) is synthesizing information on the economics  of conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, attempting to do for Biodiversity what the Stern report has done for climate change.

The study is drawing on expertise from around the world to evaluate the costs of the loss of biodiversity and the associated decline in ecosystem services worldwide, and to compare them with the costs of effective conservation and sustainable use.  The intent of the study is to sharpen awareness of the value of biodiversity and ecosystem services and facilitate the development of effective policy, as well as engaged business and citizen responses.

Their report for policy maker was released in Nov 2009, they write that it:

underlines the urgency of action, as well as the benefits and opportunities that will arise as a result of taking such action. The report shows that the cost of sustaining biodiversity and ecosystem services is lower than the cost of allowing biodiversity and ecosystem services to dwindle. It demonstrates how we can take into account the value of ecosystems and biodiversity in policy decisions and identify and support solutions, new instruments, and wider use of existing tool in order to pioneer a way forward. In so doing, the report addresses the needs of policy-makers and those in the policy-making process.

TEEB for Policy Makers Summary document

  1. The global biodiversity crisis and related policy challenge
  2. Framework and guiding principles for the policy response
  3. Strengthening indicators and accounting systems for natural capital
  4. Integrating ecosystem and biodiversity values into policy assessment
  5. Rewarding benefits through payments and markets
  6. Reforming subsidies
  7. Addressing losses through regulation and pricing
  8. Recognising the value of protected areas
  9. Investing in ecological infrastructure
  10. Responding to the value of nature

Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize in Economics

Prize Award Ceremony

Elinor Ostrom receiving her Prize from His Majesty King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden at the Stockholm Concert Hall, 10 December 2009. Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 2009. Photo: Frida Westholm

Our colleague, Lin Ostrom was just in Stockholm to receive her Nobel Prize. I was fortunate to be able to congratulate Lin Ostrom before her Nobel Lecture.  Her prize Lecture, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems » (28 min.  ) is available on the Nobel website.

Her colleagues at Indiana University have been blogging her Stockholm trip, providing some insight into her very busy ittineary, which has included sidetrips to COP 15 in Copenhagen and Uppsala.

Lin Ostrom is on the board of the Stockholm Resilience Centre, and they write:

A sparklingly happy Elinor Ostrom arrived in Stockholm to receive the prize at the Nobel ceremony on the 10t December. Professor Ostrom, who currently serves on the board of  Stockholm Resilience Centre, is a long time research associate of Stockholm Resilience Centre and its partner the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics.

“We need serious people with good theories to look at environmental problems and Stockholm Resilience Centre and the Beijer Institute has gathered extraordinary people to do this”, says Elinor Ostrom enjoying the traditional Nobel reception at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.