It really is a simple analysis. The Government fails (as usual). People who are used to being dependent will continue to run the same pattern. People are followers and creatures of habit.

Anyone who has the ability to think can figure this out.

I was in Katrina, and our neighbors that had previously not known each other banned togather to recover, but none was on welfare (not taught to depend on government). The rich man and the poor man stood in line for ice and water without conflict. There was very little looting because we stood togather against the small number of rif-raf in the area. All were equal since social status, income, or even who one may have known was not a factor (you could not call for help).

Propaganda by the media and Government ruled the day in New Orleans during Katrina because of how the affected population was taught to respond.

It really is that simple.

My original work drew inspiration from natural eco-systems as a model for resilient systems. Recently I came across a concept from this area that intrigued me- spatial heterogeneity or “patchiness”. This is an idea that is apparently overlooked by a number of ecosystem analysts who tend to use an assumption of system homogeneity to better work with designing eco-system models. Spatial Heterogeneity postulates that within a defined ecosytem space there are subtle variations of conditions that make differening patches more or less resilient in the face of disturbances. In an earth science system these differences could include soil moisture, bacterial colony density, vegetation quality, etc. which make a defined area more or less capable of absorbing the impact of a “disaster” and rebound quickly.

I believe that this concept of “patchiness” is an idea that has some application to assessing resilience in human communities. At a local level individual subcomponents of a defined community have varying degrees of potential resilience in the face of a natural or man-made disaster. In the case of the recent Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans I am sure that analysis will show that some neighborhoods “pulled together” to minimize life and personal property loss while others in close proximity (but the same socio-economic status) showed a much higher negative impact from the disaster. The subtle difference of cohesiveness factors in the various communities make each one more or less resilient in their response to impending disaster. Furthermore I believe that the individual residents in each of these neighborhoods are likely to know the degree of cohesiveness and can mentally calculate a “resilience index” for their neighborhood. If residents in a given area have an internal assumption of that area having a higher resilience capability then I believe that they will take more effective action to act more proactively in the face of approaching disaster. On the other hand residents of an area that is assumed to have a lower cohesiveness (resilience) level may be slower to respond or rebuild.

I have informally observed this factor at work in my own local middle-class neighborhoods in Arizona (USA). My particular neighborhood has what I would calculate as a low cohesiveness level. Residents are cordial but rarely interact in an extended fashion with each other on the street. It is a short street with approximately 20 houses. Many residents only seem to know the names or family composition of houses directly on either side of them. There is no clear neighborhood identity and no efforts to initiate “mingling”. I have lived in the same house for 10 years but still rarely physically see other residents who live on this street even though the turnover in housing is low with the exception of 1-2 rental homes on the street.

In an area located 1-2 streets away with the same street size and socio-economic/family composition the difference is obvious. Neighbors clearly know each other up/down the street and call each other by name in greeting. Casual observation shows visiting back & forth among neighbors all along the length of the street and group activities among neighbors occurs periodically. There is a clear difference in neighborhood identity and cohesiveness even to a casual observer.

There may even be a “stranger attractor” element at work in differing neighborhoods to borrow a concept from Chaos Theory. New residents move into these neighborhoods and either fit the mold or quickly learn to adapt. I have observed families move into my neighborhood and try mightly for a few months to inject some “cohesiveness” into dealings with residents along the street. After a period of time this effort dissipates from a lack of response and new residents adapt or move in search of a different neighborhood. More often than not the new residents fit the mold from the beginning and may even indicate that the “quietness” of the neighborhood is what initially attracted them to it. In my own case it was clear from the first months until today , 10 years later, that interaction expectations among residents would be low. Despite periodic short-burst probes to change this level it has remained cosnsistent for residents along the street. The clues were all there from the beginning for those who were attuned to them.

Other neighborhoods clearly function in a vastly different way with neighborhood residents openly greeting prospective house-hunters and buyers with open “chattiness” about the neighborhood and it’s charms. The cohesiveness of the neighborhood is evident to even casual passerbys.

The actual or potential “resilience index” of various neighborhoods which are often in close proximity to each other makes up the social “patchiness” of a habitation area. As disaster management planners design strategies to respond to potential disaster events they (like eco-system analysts) frequently assume a homogeneity or uniformity of factors across neighborhood areas even within same socio-economic zones and predicate their response actions on this basis. Thus, as I’m sure we will find, in the poorer neighborhoods in New Orleans during the evacuation phase some neighborhoods pulled together to share gasoline supplies, assist confused/distraught residents, formed caravans of evacuees and made sure the neighborhood was secure before leaving it while others adopted an “every man for himself” approach and left less able residents adrift. Planners could (in fact, should) flag lower resilience neighborhoods to maximize available support resources in any disaster management plan requiring whole neighborhood response. Given my belief that the resilience index for neighborhoods remains stable over long periods of time this identification effort could prove worthwhile.

A properly prepared “non-stigmatizing” questionaire process administered to residents of specific geographical areas could yield the results needed since I believe residents can clearly identify the cohesiveness of their neighborhoods. A social “Resilience Patchiness Map” on an area could assist police/fire and other emergency response personnel to target areas where confusion, resistence to instructions, persons left behind due to age/disability/resource limitations are likely to be higher. It could also assist post-disaster support personnel to know where organization and assistance may be needed more immediately.

Many indications point toward a coming period of a higher frequency of social and natural disasters in the world. The disaster in New Orleans should lead us to examine some of the assumptions about uniformity or homogeneity of factors used in planning to prepare for and manage the aftermath of future disaster events. The drain on financial, manpower and organizational resources is likely to be imense and any assistance in the prioritization process could pay big dividends.

John Horne
Resilience Consultant
ChannelMarker Consulting
1531 E. Weathervane Lane
Tempe, AZ USA
(480) 491-8259
chanelmark@aol.com
chanelmark@msn.com